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UNSETTLING: Bhopal and the Resolution 
of International Disputes Involving an 
Environmental Disastert 
Hanson Hosein* 
PROLOGUE 
Bhopal is no longer merely the name of a town in central India. 
It is now a convenient one-word description that evokes many dis-
concerting thoughts in the collective memory of the developed 
world: the liability of a transnational corporation, the transfer of 
hazardous technology to a developing country, and the jurisdiction 
of national courts with regards to an issue that defies borders. More 
poignantly, with the possible exception of "Chernobyl," "Bhopal" 
speaks of the worst single-incident industrial catastrophe in history.l 
"Bhopal" speaks of human misery, suffering and death. "Bhopal" 
also connotes an inability-of governments, of corporations, and of 
legal systems-to deal with a disaster that most undoubtedly will 
occur again. 
INTRODUCTION 
[AJ quick and fair settlement of the claims of all victims would 
serve their needs far better than prolonged and expensive litiga-
tion. 2 
On the night of December 2, 1984, a large quantity of methyl 
isocyanate gas (MIC) escaped from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, in 
t Copyright © Hanson Hosein 
* LL.B., B.C.L. McGill University; Member of the Massachusetts Bar; currently studying 
towards an M. en Droit (International and European Law) at the University of Paris (Pan-
theon-Assas). The author would like to thank Professor Stephen Toope, Nan Wang, Anna 
Kim, and his family for their assistance and inspiration. This article is dedicated to the author's 
father, Dr. H. Roland Hosein. 
1 Jamie Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law: Lessons from Bhopal, 29 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 
1, 2 (1991). 
2 UNION CARBIDE CORP., 1984 ANNUAL REPORT. 
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the state of Madhya Pradesh, India. 3 Carried by a breeze, the leaked 
gas eventually made its way from the plant into the adjacent homes 
of the residents of the town. Having been told that the gas would 
make a person sick but could not kill, those who awoke did not panic 
immediately. It was only when throats began to constrict and breath-
ing became labored that the residents realized what was happening. 
When the cloud cleared, the dangerous gas that the plant authori-
ties previously had represented as being carbon dioxide to the In-
dian government4 had killed 2,000 people and injured 200,000. The 
official death toll would ultimately reach more than 3,800.5 
The plant was owned and operated by Union Carbide India Lim-
ited (UCIL). The company was a subsidiary of Union Carbide Cor-
poration (UCC) of Danbury, Connecticut. UCC owned a 50.9 per-
cent stake in UCIL--enough for majority control of the subsidiary.6 
Indian governmental institutions owned 22 percent of the stock and 
the rest was held by Indian citizens.7 
In the years following the incident, UCC would acknowledge that 
the leak was due to the presence of a large amount of water in an 
MIC storage tank, which started a toxic reaction.8 As experts knew, 
and as the victims of Bhopal found out, MIC does not have the 
relatively benign effects of carbon dioxide, but rather "is extremely 
volatile and highly toxic. Its effects on human beings are horribly 
diverse and include lung damage, blindness, emphysema, tubercu-
losis, spleen and liver damage, nervous and psychological disorders, 
gynecological damage and birth defects."9 
Although the story of the victims' immediate suffering is horrific 
in itself, this Article will focus on the actions of certain key parties 
that eventually exacerbated the plight of the survivors. More spe-
cifically, this Article uses the Bhopal catastrophe as a case study in 
international dispute resolution of an incident involving a transna-
tional corporation, a host state's government, and multiple judicial 
systems-both foreign and domestic. Bhopal provides a unique con-
3 For detailed accounts of the Bhopal incident, see generally DAN KURZMAN, A KILLING 
WIND (1987); WARD MOREHOUSE & M. ARUN SUBRAMANIAM, THE BHOPAL TRAGEDY (1986); 
ALFRED DE GRAZIA, A CLOUD OVER BHOPAL (1985); SIDNEY C. SUFRIN, BHOPAL (1985). 
4 KURZMAN, supra note 3, at 28. 
5 This is the official count as of December 1990. Tim Covell, The Bhopal Disaster Litigation: 
It's Not Over Yet, 16 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 279, 279 (1991). 
6Id. at 280. 
7Id. 
S !d. at 28l. 
9 Cassels, supra note 1, at 3. 
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text. It has several aspects that both set it apart from "traditional" 
international disputes and render it all the more complex. lO The 
antagonist is a transnational corporation, acting through its partly-
owned subsidiary. Prima jacie, the protagonist is the Indian govern-
ment, acting on behalf of its citizensY The primary location is a 
developing country, necessarily involving the social, economic, and 
political baggage with which such a setting is bound to be laden. In 
an attempt to resolve the dispute, the laws, procedures, and idiosyn-
crasies of two different legal systems are encountered. Perhaps most 
importantly, Bhopal is about a human-made environmental disas-
ter-an attribute that has its own unusual consequences. 
Although the facts of the Bhopal incident are unique, the occur-
rence of industrial accidents such as those in Seveso, Italy; Basel, 
Switzerland; and Chernobyl of the former Soviet Union12 indicate 
that these incidents are happening more frequently, and are bound 
to happen again. The dire consequences of these accidents mandate 
improved preparation for international disputes regarding these 
accidents. Regardless of its seemingly atypical nature, Bhopal serves 
as an example of how such a dispute should not be settled. Part I of 
this Article will attempt to reveal the settlement processes that were 
used in the Bhopal incident. The measure of success of the outcome 
of Bhopal will then be evaluated against whether it met the priorities 
that should ideally dominate an international dispute involving an 
environmental disaster. Part II will highlight the various difficult 
considerations that must be made when choosing a dispute resolu-
tion mechanism in this type of dispute. These considerations in-
clude the conflict in legal culture, political and economic conse-
quences, enforcement difficulties, and the role of the transnational 
corporation in international law. Part III assesses various dispute 
settlement mechanisms. This Article concludes that a strict liability 
insurance fund mechanism would best achieve the fast and just 
compensation of victims-the highest priority in this type of dispute 
resolution-while adequately taking into account other competing 
factors. 
10 If indeed it is possible for any international dispute to be seen as having characteristics 
similar to previous disputes allowing for neat and painless categorization. 
11 As we shall see, Bhopal has the interesting attribute of being a potential situation that 
may involve all three possible scenarios in an international dispute: a dispute between a state 
(India) and a private party (UCC/UCIL); between private parties (the victims and 
UCC/UCIL); between states (the United States and India). 
12 See, e.g., Cassels, supra note 1, at 8. 
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I. AN EVALUATION OF THE BHOPAL SETTLEMENT 
A. International Dispute Resolution in the Case of an Environmental 
Disaster: Characteristics and Priorities 
Before examining the events leading up to the Bhopal settlement, 
it is first necessary to examine more generally the particularities of 
an international dispute created by an industrial accident. Spe-
cifically, several issues should be addressed: the definition of such a 
dispute, the nature of an environmental accident and the sub-
sequent dispute that distinguishes it from all other types of disputes, 
and the priorities in resolving the dispute. This Article addresses 
these issues in light of the dispute settlement process used in Bho-
pal. 
1. Definition and Attributes 
An international environmental dispute exists "whenever there is a 
conflict of interest between two or more states (or persons within those 
states) concerning the alteration and condition ... of the physical envi-
ronment."13 In a mass disaster context, this definition should include 
the phrase "and where there is a large number of victims." 
It is the characteristics of a human-made environmental problem 
that render an environmental dispute very complex and uncertain. 
Due to the use of elaborate technology, dangerous processes, and 
toxic materials, the facts are difficult to determine.14 Because of the 
potential long-term effects of the incident, as well as the large 
number of victims, medical causation is also difficult to ascertainY; 
Thus, any attempt to measure damages becomes difficult. Moreover, 
in order for an industrial disaster to occur, a great amount of re-
sources is initially required to create and implement the technology 
which, in turn, necessarily involves multiple actors. This makes the 
allocation of fault in a traditional legal process all the more difficult, 
making it easier to shift blame "from shoulder to shoulder indefi-
nitely."16 
Finally, in the situation of a mass disaster, the potential liability of 
the antagonist is enormous. But, where the incident involves a trans-
13 Catherine A. Cooper, The Management of International Environmental Disputes in the 
Context of Canada-United States Relations: A Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and Mecha-
nisms, 24 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 247,249 (1986) (emphasis added). 
14 Cassels, supra note 1, at 8. 
15Id. 
16Id. at 9. 
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national's subsidiary, it is difficult to obtain full recovery against the 
transnational parent, as the principles of limited liability and corpo-
rate veil are implicated. This is particularly frustrating to the victims 
when the subsidiary is a thinly-capitalized operation. In other words, 
it is more beneficial to go after the parent corporation to secure full 
compensation. The notions of incorporation, as well as the compli-
cation caused by the international aspects, may severely limit this 
course of action. 17 
2. Goals and Priorities in Settling the Dispute 
As the above discussion indicates, there is a great deal of complex-
ity and uncertainty surrounding an international dispute involving 
an environmental disaster. Given these circumstances, it is clear that 
any comprehensive attempt to resolve the dispute will take time. 
Time, however, is something that innocent victims, particularly those 
living in a developing country with limited resources, do not have. 
Therefore, the overriding priority in this context is to employ a 
dispute settlement mechanism that will provide "the most effective, 
equitable and expeditious way to get compensation to [the victims] 
at an appropriate level and in the shortest period of time."18 
A quick solution is also in the best interests of the other parties. 
For the transnational corporation, its damaged reputation and the 
business uncertainty of the yet unascertained settlement are particu-
larly detrimental. For the host developing state and its government, 
the consequences of the possible political fallout and the drain on 
its already limited means can be catastrophic. 
In addition to this preeminent concern for a rapid dispute reso-
lution, Professor Daniel MacGraw identifies five additional charac-
teristics that a good settlement must have. 19 First, the solution must 
avoid unnecessary transaction costs, such as excessive legal fees and 
expenses involved in complicated procedural issues. 2o Second, the 
solution should resolve all outstanding claims so that a quick and 
easy settlement may be achieved.21 A settlement that is not com-
pletely accepted by both parties will pose serious problems when one 
17Id. at 9-10; Giinther Hand!, Environmental Protection and Development in Third World 
Countries: Common Destiny-Common Responsibility, 20 N.Y.U. ]. INT'L L. & POL. 603, 623 
(1988). 
18 Robert E. Stein, The Settlement of Environmental Disputes: Towards A System of Flexible 
Dispute Settlement, 12 SYRACUSE]' INT'L L. & COM. 283, 293 (1985). 
19 Daniel Barstow MacGraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring a Solution, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 
835, 841-43 (1986). 
20Id. at 842. 
21Id. 
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party attempts to enforce the decision in the other party's jurisdic-
tion.22 Third, individual claims should be fairly and reasonably de-
termined.23 As will be discussed later, this is particularly difficult in 
a situation where there is great disparity, both economically and 
culturally, between the victims and the arbiters of the dispute.24 
Fourth, the compensation should be fair and adequate. 25 This is also 
complicated by economics and culture because it must be deter-
mined whether the standard of compensation should reflect the 
victims' economic and cultural circumstances, or whether it should 
correspond to the norms of the system of resolution being used. 26 
In other words, should the award be what an American or Canadian 
would get in a similar domestic tort case?27 If it should, the award 
would probably be a windfall to a plaintiff in a developing country.28 
This result may ultimately increase the risks of doing business in that 
country and thus reduce the incentive for foreign investment.29 
Finally, the importance of providing a conduct-guidance effect must 
be determined.30 Put another way, should the system provide incen-
tives or deterrence to the various actors in order to enforce a certain 
type of behavior?31 Several commentators believe that, in the envi-
ronmental context, it should.32 
With the benefit of hindsight, the author suggests that two other 
elements be included. These may be derivative of what Professor 
MacGraw outlined; however, they bear emphasizing. First, in order 
to ensure resolution of all claims, it is crucial that the dispute 
settlement mechanism be accessible to the victims. Second, in order 
to alleviate the effects of a slower-than-desired process, provision 
should be made for emergency and interim assistance while final 
compensation is being determined.33 All of these aspects should be 
22Id. 
23Id. at 842-43. 
24Id. at 843. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Id. 
30Id. 
31Id. 
32 See, e.g., Cassels, supra note I, at 7; Richard B. Bilder, The Settlement of Disputes in the 
Field of the International Law of the Environment, 1 HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS [HAGUE R.C.] 
139,162 (1975); Covell, supra note 5, at 299. 
33 Cassels, supra note I, at 7. 
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borne in mind, as we trace the events leading up to the settlement 
of the Bhopal dispute. 
B. The Bhopal Solution 
The Bhopal story is replete with ironies and contradictions. 
The sovereign state of India, proud of its hard won inde-
pendence from colonial rule, resorts to the courts of a 
foreign nation to obtain justice for its citizens. A major 
multinational corporation, whose policy is to maintain 
'centralized integrated corporate strategic planning, direc-
tion and control' argues that it had no responsibility for its 
subsidiary. And the courts of a country that is 'among the 
foremost exporters of effective liberal legal ideologies for 
the ex-colonial nations of the Third World,' concludes that 
the American legal system is incapable of even assuming 
jurisdiction over an American-based corporation, much 
less providing a remedy to the victims of the disaster.34 
1. The Actors' Behavior 
a. The Road to Adjudication 
Mter the leak of December 2, 1984, events moved quickly. The 
resort to adjudication was reflexive. The Indian government facili-
tated the legal aid process, which resulted in over 2000 claims being 
filed in the Bhopal District Court. 35 By the end of the month, the 
government was threatening to file a suit in the United States against 
UCC on behalf of the victims.36 U.S. attorneys soon arrived in Bho-
pal, signing up clients on a contingent fee basis in anticipation of 
actions to be filed in U.S. courts.37 As one commentator noted, the 
desire to use the United States as a forum was based on the Indian 
people's conviction that their legal system was in a virtual state of 
34Id. at 49. 
35 Mark Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India after the Bhopal Tragedy, 
20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 273, 284 (1985). 
36Id. 
37 Richard Shwadron, The Bhopal Incident: How the Courts Have Faced Complex International 
Litigation, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ. 445, 446 (1987). It was reported that some of the lawyers were 
"paying for signatures, misinforming clients, contracting for extremely high contingency fees, 
and taking full authority to settle." At the end of the recruitment campaign, fifty lawsuits had 
been filed in the United States, claiming over $250 million and eighty lawyers were involved, 
claiming to represent over 400,000 victims. Id. 
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"breakdown."38 Such belief "about the legal possibilities in India 
often co-exists with untroubled faith in the American legal system-
with anticipation of enormous recoveries."39 
In 1985, the Indian government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak 
Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act (Bhopal Act) .40 An indirect re-
sponse to the U.S. attorneys' campaign, the legislation had the effect 
of authorizing the Indian government to represent exclusively the 
Bhopal victims, thus consolidating the 6,500 claims that, by then, 
had been filed in IndiaY The Bhopal Act applied retroactively, but 
did allow the victims to retain counsel. It provided for the estab-
lishment of a Claims Scheme, and gave parens patriae authority to 
the government.42 And, "of more immediate importance, it allowed 
the Indian government to take over the litigation already com-
menced in the United States, to dictate strategy, and to scuttle 
ongoing settlement negotiations. "43 
Before ultimately resorting to adjudication, the parties attempted 
settlement. At the outset, UCC indicated its desire to negotiate.44 
India also had an interest in settling, as such an outcome would 
allow the government to avoid becoming a formal party, and thus 
escape exposing itself to claims by other plaintiffs.45 During the 
settlement process, the jockeying between the parties involved 
UCC's attempt to blame the incident on local management and the 
Indian government.46 In April 1 985, Prime Minister Gandhi rejected 
UCC's offer of $200 million,47 claiming that it was insufficient. 48 
Three days after rejecting the offer, India filed suit in the United 
States.49 
38 Galanter, supra note 35, at 287. In fact, even some members of the Indian legal commu-
nity professed this sentiment. [d. 
39 [d. 
4oNo. 26 of 1985 (29 March 1985), cited in Cassels, supra note 1, at 12. 
41 Covell, supra note 5, at 283. 
42 Cassels, supra note 1, at 13. 
43 [d. 
44 Stein, supra note 18, at 294. The author also added, "Of course they [VCC) want to 
negotiate. Negotiation is faster, fosters better public relations and will enable them to continue 
to produce their goods." [d. 
45 Galanter, supra note 35, at 285. 
46 In fact, up to this date, VCC still maintains that the leak was caused by the sabotage of a 
disgruntled employee. See Cassels, supra note 1, at 4. 
47 Note that all figures, unless otherwise indicated, are in V.S. dollar amounts. 
48 Galanter, supra note 35, at 285. It was noted by some that VCC's offer was equivalent to 
the insurance coverage reportedly carried by the company. [d. 
49 [d. at 285-86. 
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b. The u.s. Forum 
By the time suit was filed, claims totalling $250 billion had been 
instituted in various U.S. courts. 50 These claims were consolidated 
for the showdown that would occur in the New York District Court. 51 
Given the legal separation between parent and subsidiary, India had 
a difficult argument to make for the imposition of liability on UCC 
for the acts of UCIL. 52 The "multinational enterprise liability" theory 
that India advanced was controversial,53 It held that a transnational 
corporation, with a controlling majority interest in a hazardous 
activity abroad, is deemed to have a non-delegable, absolute duty to 
assure that the activity does not cause any danger or damage to the 
people or the state.54 
India did not get a chance, however, to advance any substantive 
arguments because inJuly 1985, UCC brought a preliminary motion 
to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens: "Union Carbide, 
anxious to avoid American tort doctrine, American damage awards, 
and American juries argued that the United States was not the 
proper forum and began to paint the picture of an innovative, 
sophisticated, and vigorous Indian legal system, well up to the task 
at hand."55 
Attempting to counter this position, India argued that justice would 
be better served in the United States than in India.56 India con-
tended that delays inherent in the Indian court system would lead 
to an unconscionable delay in the resolution of the caseY Further-
more, it alleged that India's system lacked the procedural and prac-
50 Cassels, supra note 1, at 16. 
51Id. 
52Id. at 27. 
53Id. 
54 Union of India's Complaint, in MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY; THE 
BHOPAL CASE 4-5 (The Indian Law Institute 1986) [hereinafter INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE]; see 
also Gunther Handl & Robert E. Lutz, An International Policy Perspective on the Trade of 
Hazardous Materials and Technologies, 30 HARV. INT'L LJ. 351, 371 (1989). This theory was 
premised on the Indian Supreme Court case of M.C. Metha v. Union of India, [1987] A.I.R. 
(S.C.) 1086, cited in Covell, supra note 5, at 283-84. 
For additional commentary on the issue of liability of a transnational corporation for the 
acts of its subsidiary, see Walter Kolvenbach, European Reflections on Bhopal and the Conse-
quences for Transnational Corporations, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 357 (6) (Nov. 1986) and Charles C. 
Hileman, Multinational Enterprise Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 
66(5) (Feb. 1987). 
55 Cassels, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
56Id. The Indian media, bench, and bar were reportedly outraged and/or resigned to this 
argument. Id. 
57 See id. 
294 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVI, No.2 
tical capability to handle the litigation.58 The New York District Court 
agreed with VCC. 59 
Judge Keenan reasoned that India's system offered an adequate 
alternative forum and that both private and public interests favored 
India as the appropriate jurisdiction.6o The parent, VCC, had little 
involvement in the Indian operation, and the victims, witnesses, and 
documentary evidence were located primarily in India.61 Addition-
ally, the plant was regulated by Indian law.62 Consequently, it would 
be paternalistic to apply those laws in a V.S. court or to impose V.S. 
standards of health and safety.63 For Judge Keenan, "to retain the 
litigation [in the Vnited States] would be yet another example of 
imperialism, another situation in which an established sovereign 
inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a developing nation."64 
c. The Indian Forum 
In September 1986, the Indian government filed suit for damages 
worth over $3 billion in the Bhopal District Court.65 A series of 
adjournments, on-and-offnegotiations, and changes injudges, how-
ever, delayed the court decision.66 At one point during the negotia-
tions in 1987, India was about to accept VCC's offer of $500 mil-
lion.67 Talks collapsed, however, after activist groups, demanding a 
settlement of at least $3 billion, organized a protest campaign.68 
In December 1987, the Bhopal District Court ordered VCC to pay 
$270 million in interim relief.69 On appeal by VCC, the state High 
Court reduced payment to $190 million, reasoning that the District 
Court had failed to find the company liable before proclaiming the 
58 As stated in India's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Union Carbide Corporation's 
Motion to Dismiss these Actions on the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens, in INDIAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, supra note 54, at 87-90. 
59 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 842 (S.D.N.V. 1986). 
60Id. at 852-66. 
61 Id. at 852-60. 
62Id. 
63 See Cassels, supra note I, at 17. 
64In Re: Union Carbide Corporation Gas Leak Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, 
601 F. Supp. 1035, in INCONVENIENT FORUM AND CONVENIENT CATASTROPHE: THE BHOPAL 
CASE 69 (The Indian Law Institute 1986). 
65 Sanjoy Hazarika, Bhopal Payments Uy Union Carbide Set at $470 million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15,1989, at AI; see also Union ofIndia v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 1113 (D. Bhopal, India 
1986). 
66 Hazarika, supra note 65, at AI. One judge who was hearing the case was later removed 
when it was discovered that he was one of the 500,000 claimants. Id. 
67Id. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
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award.70 VCC appealed the decision again in the Indian Supreme 
Court.7! 
2. Settlement 
a. The Indian Supreme Court: "Placing the Government on a 
Strong Wicket" 
On February 14, 1989, fifty months, two countries and three 
courts after the disaster at Bhopal, the parties settled for $470 mil-
lion-the largest settlement for an industrial accident ever.72 It was 
based on a ruling by Chief Justice Pathak of the Indian Supreme 
Court.73 After four months of preparation and oral argument, the 
Chief Justice interrupted counsel's argument and ordered the "set-
tlement."74 Both parties promptly agreed to the deaP5 
The Court did not address who was to blame, or any other legal 
issues. I t dismissed all criminal charges and civil suits in India against 
VCC and the former chairperson of VCc. 76 The Court simply or-
dered the award to be paid in a lump sum by March 31, 1989. As 
the Chief Justice stated, "[t]he case is pre-eminently fit for an overall 
settlement between the parties covering all litigations, claims, rights 
and liabilities related and arising out of the litigation. "77 
As one commentator observed, it is unlikely that the settlement 
was "imposed."78 The Indian government and VCC had been se-
cretly engaged in negotiations in the weeks leading up to the hear-
ing.79 Quite possibly, the intervention by Chief Justice Pathak was a 
formality, designed to protect the Indian government from criti-
cism.80 The Supreme Court commands a great deal of respect in 
India. Accordingly, its intervention would make the settlement look 
less like a "sell-out" on the part of the Indian government.8! Addi-
tionally, by refraining from insisting on its original demand for $3.3 . 
billion, the government avoided having its country labelled as an 
70Id. 
71Id. 
72Id. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Cassels, supra note 1, at 37. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
8l Hazarika, supra note 65, at AI. 
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"unreliable" and "uncooperative" developing country in which to 
invest. 82 As one lawyer remarked, "[w]e feel that once the Supreme 
Court says it's fair, the government will be on a strong wicket."83 
b. Aftermath of the Settlement 
At the time of the settlement, 500,000 claims had been filed, and 
the Indian government had spent more than $70 million on health 
care and relief for the victims.84 There remained the question of 
distribution of the settlement award. No scheme for how to distrib-
ute the lump sum among the victims had been devised. 
Distribution was further delayed by petitions that were filed to 
overturn the Supreme Court settlement on grounds such as the 
constitutionality of the Bhopal Act, the inadequacy of the settle-
ment, and the resurrection of criminal charges against VCC 
officials.85 The Indian Supreme Court postponed the distribution 
until all of the petitions were resolved.86 By the middle of 1990, 
400,000 eligible claimants had received nothing, although it was 
agreed that $210 million could be distributed.87 Then various lobby 
groups backed by the new Indian government challenged the judg-
ment, claiming that the settlement was too low.88 In October 1991, 
the Indian Supreme Court upheld the settlement, but withdrew the 
criminal immunity previously granted to VCC officials.89 As late as 
1992, Indian authorities were threatening the seizure of VCIL prop-
erty unless VCC officials appeared in India to face criminal 
charges.9o 
3. Problems with the Bhopal Solution 
a. Speed 
The Bhopal settlement flagrantly violated a primary principle of 
dispute resolution: speed. From the date of the catastrophe to the 
82 David Bergman, The Long Wait for Justice, NEW LJ. 1747, 1747 (Dec. 14, 1990). 
83 Cassels, supra note 1, at 37. 
84 Hazarika, supra note 65, at AI. 
85 Cassels, supra note 1, at 42. 
86 Covell, supra note 5, at 280. 
87 Sanjoy Hazarika, Payments in Bhopal Are Going Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at A2. 
88Id. 
89 Edward A. Gargan, Settlement on Bhopal is Accepted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,1991, at 04. 
90 Carbide Seizure Vowed, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Feb. 3, 1992. 
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settlement, four years elapsed. The delay, III and of itself, was a 
disaster. 
i. The Legalization of the Dispute 
One of the reasons for the delay was the legalization of the 
dispute. The early participation of the U.S. lawyers in Bhopal may 
have alerted the victims to their rights of redress. With the presence 
of U.S. attorneys, the help of the Indian government through its 
facilitation of legal aid, and the prospect of a hefty recovery from a 
rich U.S. corporation, Bhopal was almost immediately "legalized." 
This limited any possibility of a quick non-traditional solution: "Set-
tlement negotiations were begun by one group and rejected by 
another. The hopes of the victims were raised impossibly high, while 
behind closed doors, they were being used simply as bargaining 
chips by lawyers jockeying for control of the litigation. "91 
In addition to the behavior of the lawyers, the inherent limitations 
of the applicable law further impeded the process. Not only did the 
motion for forum non conveniens have a dilatory effect, but the ability 
to establish a negligence claim under traditional tort law also would 
have been virtually impossible. Essentially, "it would have to be 
demonstrated that uee had a duty to oversee its Bhopal operation; 
that it breached that duty by failing to use reasonable care; that this 
failure caused the gas leak; and that the gas caused the damage 
suffered by each individual victim."92 Had settlement not been 
reached in 1989, Bhopal could still be in the courts. Even with 
India's theory of transnational liability, it is highly unlikely that uee 
would have acquiesced to an unacceptable Indian judicial decision. 
The ensuing enforcement battle in the U.S. courts would have taken 
years to conclude. 
ii. The Politicization of the Dispute 
Politicization of the affair further exacerbated the retardation in 
reaching a settlement. The Indian government's prompt involve-
ment in the matter on behalf of the victims ensured that a quick 
and easy settlement would be a political liability. This observation is 
reinforced by the elaborate fapde that had to be developed in order 
to show that the settlement was engineered by the Indian Supreme 
91 Cassels, supra note 1, at II. 
92Id. at 24. 
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Court,93 and thus would have to be complied with by the govern-
ment. Also, the government probably backed itself into a corner, 
having promised a harsh resolution against UCC in the election 
immediately prior to the settlement.94 At the very least, it was clear 
that Indian politicians were using the incident to bolster their 
chances at the polls.95 
Moreover, grassroots activism seeking aid for victims further com-
plicated matters. Given the large number of activist groups involved, 
it was difficult to determine who spoke for the victims.96 It was also 
obvious that, based on the relative strength of these groups, they 
would not suffer an unsatisfactory settlement passively.97 
b. Conformity with Other Characteristics of a Good Settlement 
By circumventing the activity of the U.S. lawyers through the 
Bhopal Act, the Indian government was successful in preventing the 
potential payout of contingent fees by the victims.9s Through its 
representation of the victims, India in effect created a class action.99 
The concept of a class action in this situation has its merits, espe-
cially when the victims had no other means of legal redress, or much 
power by themselves.1Oo The consequences of the method employed 
by the Indian government, however, had the effect of producing 
unnecessary transaction costs, and may have been more detrimental 
than if the government had refrained from intervening.101 
Although the Bhopal Act had been deemed constitutional by the 
Indian judiciary, 102 had the litigation proceeded any further, it would 
have been exceedingly difficult to enforce the decision in the United 
93 See Covell, supra note 5, at 297. 
94Id. at 297-98. 
95Id. 
96 Cassels, supra note 1, at 11. 
97 See Bergman, supra note 82, at 1748. 
98 See Cassels, supra note 1, at 13. In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that, under U.S. constitutional law, it is acceptable for the government to suspend a 
plaintiffs claim based on the President's powers to change the substantive law and settle the 
claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments. 453 U.S. 654, 684-86 (1981). The Court, 
however, qualified this point by stating that the President also provided an alternative forum 
(in that case, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal) to allow nationals to settle their claims. Id. at 
686-88. In the case of Bhopal, no alternative forum was provided to the victims by the Indian 
government. 
99 Cassels, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
100Id. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
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States. I03 This is due to the questionable legality of the statute in its 
disregard for individual rights through the use of the parens patriae 
power. I04 In the United States, parens patriae can only be used by the 
state when it has an interest in the litigation, independent of that 
of its citizens. 105 It may not be exercised merely to collect damages 
for someone who is legally entitled to the claim.106 Thus, the U.S. 
courts could have refused to enforce the claim on the basis of a lack 
of due process. 107 
In addition, India arguably had a conflict of interest. Given its lax 
administration of health and safety requirements,Io8 its partial own-
ership ofUCIL, and the political liability of Bhopal, the government 
itself was a potential litigant. IOg Consequently, the government was 
incapable of fully looking after the best interests of the victims. llo 
This infirmity, along with the lack of an effective distribution 
scheme, impeded the fair determination of the victims' claims. 
With regard to the adequacy of the settlement, given the govern-
ment of India's initial claim of over $3 billion, III the final amount 
of $470 million1!2 perhaps seems paltry. Indeed, the settlement was 
so much smaller than many had expected that on the day of the 
announcement, UCC stock rose by $2.00.113 But, given the fact that 
the compensation each victim received constituted nearly fifty times 
India's GNP per capita, and was equivalent to $1 million per person 
in the United States,1l4 the award hardly was inadequate. Neverthe-
less, on a comparative basis, the punitive effect of the settlement 
must be questioned. More precisely, transnational corporations ar-
guably are provided with the incentive to establish their more dan-
gerous operations in poor countries, "where compensation will be 
lower along with living standards."115 
103 ld. 
104 ld. 
IDS ld. 
106 ld. 
107 ld. 
108 Examples of poor governmental regulation include: placing the plant close to a densely 
populated area of the city; providing no information about the nature of the substances at 
the plant or the technological and environmental risks; providing no warning or emergency 
procedures; and, providing no proper medical facilities. Cassels, supra note 1, at 5. 
109 Cassels, supra note 1, at 14. 
110 See id. at 15. 
III Hazarika, supra note 65, at AI. 
112 ld. 
113 The Ghosts of Bhopal, ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 1989, at 70 [hereinafter Ghosts]. 
114 ld. 
115 ld. 
" 
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4. Summary of the Bhopal Solution 
Considering the attributes and priorities of the resolution of an 
international dispute in the case of a mass environmental disaster, 
the Bhopal solution is wholly inadequate. Unfortunately, criticizing 
the Bhopal process is much easier than providing a more effective 
alternative. This is due to various issues, mainly attributable to the 
nature of, and differences between, the two major players in the 
dispute: the transnational corporation and the host state. Using 
Bhopal as an example, these factors shall be studied in depth in the 
next part, with an eye towards an assessment of the assorted settle-
ment mechanism possibilities applicable to this very difficult type of 
international dispute. 
II. IMPORTANT VARIABLES TO CONSIDER WHEN SELECTING A 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
A. Problems lVhen Dealing with a Foreign State 
1. Variables in Legal Culture 
a. Expectations Based on Culture 
Before implementing a settlement solution, great care must be 
taken in considering how compatible the remedy will be with the 
victims' cultural context. Usually, the most obvious consideration is 
to avoid imposing Western values and expectations upon the victims. 
Injury that U.S. citizens may consider a violation of their personal 
rights might not be seen as much more than a vicissitude of life in 
another culture, to be absorbed into the "karmic fatalism"1l6 that 
characterizes that culture. In the Bhopal case, the differences in 
legal culture between the West and India can be quite distinct: 
The Bhopal disaster is an enormous, dramatic event, but 
the slaughter of the innocent that goes on in India's roads, 
fields, mines, and factories is constant. There are little 
'Bhopals' many times over every year-say in the harvest 
season when new kinds of machinery are brought into the 
fields to be used alongside labourers who are completely 
unfamiliar with such machinery. In case of injury, there 
may be a payment on the spot. But ordinarily there is no 
116 Cassels, supra note 1, at 22. 
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expectation of any legal remedy. . . . Disasters large and 
small in India typically have no legal consequences. ll7 
301 
Put more succinctly, an industrial disaster in the developing world 
does not usually give rise to compensatory litigation.1l8 
For various reasons, however, Bhopal represented a marked de-
parture from the traditional attitudes towards acquiring a legal rem-
edy. Indeed, "[ t] here was an immediate sense that compensation 
should and could be paid. For many, it was important that compen-
sation be calculated at American levels."1l9 As was previously men-
tioned, the appearance of the U.S. lawyers on the scene quickly 
made the victims aware of what rights and remedies were open to 
them.120 Furthermore, the fact that the antagonist in the disaster was 
a large U.S. transnational incited outrage and horror, both in India, 
which suddenly seemed indignant with a sense of colonial exploita-
tion,121 and in the United States, where such behavior would not be 
tolerated without a massive litigation battle.122 
Learning from the Bhopal experience, there is no reason why any 
future industrial disaster elsewhere in the world involving a transna-
tional would not provoke a similar shift in cultural expectations, 
producing an expectation of damages at relatively high Western 
levels. The method that the victims may choose to pursue compen-
sation, however, given the valuable lessons learned from the tortur-
ous Bhopal litigation, may vary. 
b. The Legal System 
Perhaps a more difficult subject to be addressed is the adequacy 
of the host state's legal infrastructure to cope with efforts to settle 
the dispute, whether by adjudication or other means. In Bhopal, this 
was a core issue, particularly during the adjudication of the forum 
non conveniens motion in the United States.123 In other words, could 
the legal system of the host state be applied to the dispute? Could 
the law of the host state be used to settle the dispute? Even if 
117 Galanter, supra note 35, at 280. 
118 Rajeev Dhavan, For Whom? And For What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhapal, 
20 TEX. INT'L LJ. 295, 295 (1985). 
119 Galanter, supra note 35, at 280-81. 
120 R.S. Khare, The Bhopal Puzzle: A Failure of Modern Technology Law and Values, 41 INT'L 
Soc. SCLJ. 273, 276 (1989). 
121 Galanter, supra note 35, at 281. 
122 See Cassels, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
123 [d. at 16. 
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adjudication is not the dispute settlement method of choice, could 
the legal infrastructure adequately implement or enforce the settle-
ment? 
In India's case, the legal system is slow, inefficient, and often 
ineffective. Given the standard multiple-year delays in acquiring a 
remedy in a civil action, interlocutory relief is usually the final 
disposition of the case.124 Depending on one's perspective, compen-
sation under Indian law is likely to be inadequate, as "[t]he Indian 
law of torts follows the British, erring wherever on the side of 
meanness."125 Nevertheless, with respect to the Bhopal incident, it 
was still shocking to see how readily leading Indian jurists acquiesced 
to the displacement of the legal action to the United States at the 
outset. 126 
A more serious factor must be taken into account however, when 
considering the legal administrative regime in the host state: spe-
cifically, the civil status of the victims. Particularly in developing 
countries, where social welfare schemes are lacking, it is very difficult 
to determine who exactly are the victims. This was especially the case 
in Bhopal: 
The problem of identifying the victims is deep-seated. In-
dia is a society in which about the top three percent of 
earners pay income tax. It is not an orderly, highly regu-
lated society .... Few Indians have drivers licenses. There 
is no social security system or national health system. It is 
a society in which many people can go through life without 
leaving any definitive official record of their identity.127 
Such difficult conditions not only make the ascertainment of victims 
difficult, but also render the distribution of the settlement more 
problematic. 
2. Political and Economic Factors 
When addressing the issue of an international dispute settlement 
in the case of an environmental disaster, a pervasive factor is whether 
the risks of doing business in the host state will be affected. In other 
words, how much will a long or inconvenient dispute settlement 
124Dhavan, supra note 118, at 297. 
125 [d. at 301. 
126 Galanter, supra note 35, at 281. 
127 [d. at 282. 
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process, possibly accompanied by a relatively high award, provide a 
disincentive to a transnational corporation to invest in that particu-
lar state? In the case of labour markets, a transnational business 
shops for the most conducive forum for its operations, particularly 
when its operations involve hazardous technology and/ or hazardous 
substances. Maintaining the "business-friendly" atmosphere of the 
country is therefore a major consideration. 
Dispute settlement aside, a developing country can also be in-
clined to disregard the protection of the environment in its search 
for foreign investment. As a result, the state may not provide ade-
quate environmental regulation to protect its interests and its citi-
zens. 128 In India, the dilemma is particularly acute. It is deeply in 
debt to the International Monetary Fund, and the Soviet economy 
no longer supports it.129 As a consequence, India is trying to sell itself 
to the business elite.130 
In the future, India will continue to look for a considerable 
amount of high technology foreign investment. It has to 
decide whether it should allow this investment to take place 
on the basis of low environmental safeguards with the 
understanding that it will ultimately be the poor who will 
pay the price of the unregulated progress. When environ-
mental disasters occur, the victims of these disasters, per-
haps led by their foreign lawyers, may be inclined to go 
forum shopping in their desperate bids for compensatory 
justice. It is quite clear that the price of a life or suffering 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.131 
To effectively counter India's dilemma, and in effect, the dilemma 
of the entire developing world, any dispute settlement mechanism 
should be accompanied, to some extent, by international environ-
mental standards. If these standards are applied uniformly and com-
prehensively, neither the transnational corporation nor the develop-
ing country need consider whether a more "business-friendly"132 
128 Handl & Lutz, supra note 54, at 355 (pointing out that there is a prevalence of differing 
risk sensitivities among nations). 
129 India: Trade Without the Flag, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 34. 
130 Id. In fact, some of India's newest investors in the past year include General Motors, 
General Electric, IBM, Coca-Cola, Kelloggs, BMW, and Ford. Among some of the industries 
represented are: telecommunications, petrochemicals, power generation, and cellular tele-
phones.Id. 
131 Dhavan, supra note 118, at 306. 
132 And thus possibly, "environmentally-unfriendly." 
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state is available. By comforting both parties in this way, the host 
state will be able to protect its citizens better. Furthermore, the use 
of international environmental standards will help alleviate the ar-
guably unfair loss of employment in the developed world when a 
transnational corporation sets up operations in a developing coun-
try in search of higher profits. 133 
Unfortunately, even uniformly-applied international standards 
cannot fully assuage the concerns of a developing country. First, the 
hazardous substances and technologies that the developing country 
imports and sometimes even manufactures are crucial to the indus-
trial and agricultural well-being of that country.134 Second, although 
strict regulation may create a more even playing field with respect 
to attracting foreign investment, it does nothing to encourage the 
development of domestic industry which may be unable to afford 
the luxuries of environmental safeguards.135 Thus, any notion of 
international environmental policies when considering methods of 
dispute settlement has a downside because it could ultimately exac-
erbate ideological differences concerning demands for a new inter-
national economic order.136 
3. Enforcement of the Settlement 
The final consideration, which most acutely highlights the effect 
that the international factor has on this type of dispute, is how the 
remedy of the selected mechanism will be enforced. Typically, if the 
host government is advocating on behalf of the victims as it did in 
Bhopal, it would have to go to the court in the jurisdiction of the 
transnational to enforce the award after settlement. This type of 
outcome, of course, assumes that the transnational corporation re-
fuses to pay voluntarily the ordered compensation. 
Enforcement is clearly the linchpin in the effectiveness of any 
dispute settlement mechanism. In Bhopal, "[h]ad an Indian court 
found Union Carbide liable and forced a huge settlement, the 
company, in the interests of the shareholders, would have refused 
to pay up-even though it had earlier agreed to abide by Indian 
law."137 As discussed earlier, UCC could have a strong case in the U.S. 
133 Clarence J. Dias, International Cooperation far Survival: Lessons from Bhopal, 15 CAN. 
COUNCIL INT'L L. 152, 172 (1986). 
134 Handl & Lutz, supra note 54, at 352. 
135Bilder, supra note 32, at 147. 
136 Ghosts, supra note 113, at 70. 
137Id. 
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courts by arguing that due process was not respected when the 
Indian government represented the victims.138 
For UCC, or any transnational, the issue of enforcement can be 
a powerful bargaining chip when attempting to reach an advanta-
geous settlement. India, or any developing country, cannot neces-
sarily expect that a seizure of the company's assets within its borders 
will easily satisfy the corporation's debt, or provide any substantial 
threat that will force the transnational to pay Up.139 Likewise, the 
prospect of an enforcement battle in the courts of another jurisdic-
tion is a sure recipe for several more years of delay in getting relief 
to the victims.14o 
To preempt such a fatal result, quick and certain enforcement 
must be realized. But as will become apparent in the attempt to 
evaluate the more effective methods of enforcing a settlement in-
volving parties from two different states, problems of international 
law necessarily arise. Use of the law that "governs relations between 
... states"14I in a situation involving a private party, namely the 
transnational corporation, begs the question: who are the appropri-
ate parties to such a dispute? 
B. The Role of International Law and the Determination of the Actors 
1. National Law Revisited 
At this point, discussion of a dispute resolution in an environ-
mental disaster context can go in two directions. The first is to 
suggest that any dispute settlement mechanism involving an envi-
ronmental disaster should stay within the realm of national law. Such 
an approach, however, may result in a solution similar to the one 
attempted in Bhopal where the national courts of the United States 
and India referred to private international law and domestic rules 
of procedural and substantive law. As with Bhopal, however, this type 
of "domestic" solution can be a failure. 
Notwithstanding Bhopal, there may be ways of providing an ade-
quate domestic legal regime with which to handle international 
138 But see supra note 98 and accompanying text (regarding Dames & Moore v. Regan. 453 
U.S. 654 (1981)). 
139 Glwsts, supra note 113. Nor can a country expect to force corporate directors to appear 
to face criminal charges, as the Indian authorities have attempted to do. Union Carbide's 
Ex-Chairman is Target of Arrest Warrant in India, WALL ST.]., Mar. 30, 1992, at B15. 
140 Glwsts, supra note 113. 
l41 The Steamship Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.]. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18. 
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disputes. This would include having the host state adopt and imple-
ment comprehensive national legislation that applies to existing and 
future industries within the state. 142 Such legislation could remedy 
problems like those in Bhopal, such as jurisdiction, consolidation of 
claims, interim relief, liability, procedure, and distribution of com-
pensation.143 Nevertheless, there are several problems with such a 
regime. 
The most obvious problem is enforcement. The transnational 
corporation would still be operating through a subsidiary. As pre-
viously discussed, this creates difficulties. 144 First, there may be 
difficulty in securing full payment because it is likely that only the 
parent corporation, headquartered in a developed country, will have 
sufficient resources to pay the award.145 Moreover, the existence of 
local government regulation can actually work against the host 
state. 146 A defendant corporation could conceivably avoid legalliabil-
ity by showing that even though the host state had regulated haz-
ardous substances and technology, the state itself failed to police 
adequately the rules it imposed.147 Thus, the disaster could be attrib-
uted to the fault of the subsidiary which, with respect to operations, 
could be completely autonomous from the parent.148 Contributory 
fault on the part of the state for failure to enforce its own laws could 
additionally be asserted.149 In this way, the parent corporation could 
escape liability.150 
Even if the state's legislation makes provision for enforcement 
through some type of insurance fund, similar to a U.S.-type "Super-
fund, "151 where contributions are made regularly by the industry, the 
142 Covell, supra note 5, at 304-05. 
143Id. 
144 Ghosts, supra note 113. 
145 See generally Cassels, supra note 1, at 26-36. 
146 See generally id. 
147 See generally id. 
148 See generally id. 
149 See generally id. 
150Id. at 20. 
151 The "Superfund" is a domestic $1.6 billion hazardous substances spill and waste disposal 
site cleanup program. Funds come from taxes on crude oil and chemical feedstock and by 
general revenues. This regime allows the federal government to respond immediately to a 
hazardous spill or site by using the fund, and then later shift the cost of the cleanup to the 
responsible parties. Frederick R. Anderson, Negotiation and Informal Agency Action: The Case 
of Superfund, 1985 DUKE LJ. 261; see also RICHARD H. GASKINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ACCIDENTS 
230 (1988). 
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state could encounter the contention that its obsession with regula-
tion of business is tantamount to nationalization. 152 A developing 
country must be very sensitive to the degree with which it regulates 
business if it wants to attract foreign capital. I53 
Because of these two very important considerations-enforce-
ment and the factors involved in doing business in the developing 
world-a national regime of dispute resolution is arguably still in-
adequate. This leads to the second manner of approaching a dispute 
resolution: international law. 
2. International Law 
The previous critique of applying national law begs the question: 
why was international law not considered initially in Bhopal? The 
answer lies in the nature of the dispute. International environmental 
law is still in an initial stage of development. At this point in time, 
judicial dispute resolution in this context is not adequately equipped 
to deal with the transfer and effects of hazardous technology.154 
Indeed, the lack of international environmental norms and institu-
tions is precisely why parties have had to rely on national law and 
courts. 155 Bhopal effectively highlights the weaknesses of a national 
law solution, more than other incidents, such as the one in Seveso, 
Italy.156 In Seve so , the transnational corporation accepted responsi-
bility at an early stage, thus making the level of compensation the 
issue in dispute. 157 In Bhopal, however, given the considerably higher 
level of damage, there was an understandable reticence on the part 
of vee to accept liability, thus making vee's fault the focus of the 
dispute. This factor made dispute settlement considerably more 
contentious and consequently more protracted. 
Accordingly, international law must playa part in dispute settle-
ments of environmental disasters-be it through treaties, principles, 
or institutions. Thus, one must understand the idiosyncrasies of 
152 See Covell, supra note 5, at 304. 
153 [d. 
154 See Milton R. Wessel, Alternative Dispute Resolution fur the Socioscientific Dispute, 1 J.L. & 
TECH. 1,3-6 (1986). 
155 [d. at 18. 
156This accident involved an explosion in a Hoffman-Laroche (a Swiss company) chemical 
plant. Dioxin, which was released into the air, caused skin disease among the inhabitants of 
the region, damage to produce and livestock, and economic disruption. [d. at 3-5. 
157 [d. 
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international law before examining the types of mechanisms avail-
able. Focus is given on the role a transnational corporation plays in 
international law. Simply put, the problem is as follows: 
Because international law lacks a central lawmaking 
authority and a comprehensive enforcement mechanism, 
its effectiveness depends upon the willingness of its partici-
pants to cooperate in developing laws and to comply with 
those laws. The participants, with limited exceptions, are 
states. A corporation, as a private actor, is not a subject of 
international law.158 
Although corporations are not international legal persons in the 
technical sense, a transnational corporation is a significant actor on 
the international scene.159 Specifically, there are two ways that a 
corporation can be involved in a dispute involving international law: 
indirectly through the doctrine of state responsibility,160 and directly 
through the use of voluntary codes of conduct.161 
a. State Responsibility: Indirect Transnational Participation 
i. A Traditional Understanding 
Essentially, the doctrine of state responsibility defines one state's 
right of redress against another state that has breached an interna-
tionallaw.162 Under this doctrine, the United States would be subro-
gated to ueC's place against the Indian government because uee 
is not a subject under international law. State responsibility, however, 
does not extend to the acts or omissions of business corporations or 
state-owned enterprises, if they are not exercising de facto power 
and authority of the state. 163 As a result, it is technically impossible 
for the United States to be held liable for the acts or omissions of 
uee. 
158 Douglas T. Hamilton, Regulation of Corporations under International Environmental Law, 
reprinted in the Proceedings ofthe 1989 Conference of the Canadian Council on International 
Law, Preserving the Global Environment [unpublished version, also available in 93 CAN. COUN-
CIL INT'L L. 3 (1989)]. 
159 Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Work of the International Law Commission Relating to Trans-
frontier Environmental Harm, 20 N.Y.V.]. INT'L L. & POL. 715, 728 (1988). 
160 See infra notes 162-75 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 176-78. 
162Hamilton, supra note 158, at 4. 
163Id. 
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n. A New Theory of State Responsibility 
Nevertheless, some commentators have suggested that the corpo-
ration's home state can be held liable under international law if the 
dispute involves environmental issues. 164 According to the Barcelona 
Traction, Light and Power Co. Case, a corporation adopts the nation-
ality of the state in which it is incorporated and in whose territory 
its head office is located.165 The issue then arises whether the state 
is responsible for regulating the foreign activities and conduct of the 
transnational enterprise incorporated within its jurisdiction.166 
Those who espouse a theory of state responsibility analogize to a 
transfrontier pollution situation:167 
[A] state in which a multinational corporation (MNC) is 
incorporated or headquartered or from which hazardous 
technology is exported ... should be liable for injurious 
consequences in another state ... caused by the operation 
there of a plant by a subsidiary of the MNC, or by the 
imported technology. In this scenario, the "transfrontier" 
element would consist not of pollution crossing a border, 
but of the export of hazardous substances or technology.168 
Conversely, doctrinal objections to this theory are based in part 
on the "paternalistic overtones" this approach would have in a de-
veloping country.169 Further, the developing country ultimately 
could be harmed, as the exporting state discourages transnational 
corporations from exporting technology to, and investing in, a de-
veloping countryYo Additionally, developing countries generally 
have less bargaining power and might be subject to unfavorable 
liability provisions in bilateral or multilateral investment treaties 
designed by the capital and technology exporting states.l7l 
The theory, however, does have its merits. Since the United States 
exports hazardous products and technologies to developing coun-
tries, and its transnational corporations engage in practices abroad 
164McCaffrey, supra note 159, at 723. 
165 (1970) I.C.]. Rep. 3. 
166Hamilton, supra note 158, at 12. 
167Id. at 14; Handl, supra note 17, at 625; Dias, supra note 133, at 175. 
16S Hamilton, supra note 158, at 14. 
169McCaffrey, supra note 159, at 724. 
170 !d. at 725. 
171 See] ay Lawrence Westbrook, Themes of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an 
International Settlement, 20 TEX. INT'L L.]. 321, 325-26 (1985). 
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that would not be tolerated in this country, the United States should 
playa supervisory role, I72 Extraterritorial legislation has been used 
by countries such as the United States when it is convenient. 173 
Similarly, the European Community Parliament has initiated proce-
dures to ensure that European firms maintain comparable levels of 
safety in their subsidiaries abroad,174 
Despite the merits of this theory, the doctrine of state responsibil-
ity does not conform to the characteristics of a good settlement. An 
international claim of this type concerning a mass environmental 
disaster would probably be a long and expensive process, involving 
diplomatic representation and culminating years later in arbitration 
or international adjudication. 175 
Because such a dispute between two states would not lend itself 
to a quick resolution, only solutions between private parties or be-
tween a state and a private party will be considered in evaluating 
alternative dispute resolution techniques. Nonetheless, the indirect 
participation of both states is necessary when the creation of inter-
national treaties or institutions is required to deal with the dispute. 
b. International Codes of Conduct: Direct Transnational 
Participation 
As is evident, special international rules and regulations are re-
quired to deal with international disputes involving environmental 
disasters. The premise of such an assertion is: "[T]ransnational 
actors who are in a position to exercise effective control over the 
trans boundary transfer must be deemed to owe a commensurate 
international obligation to prevent, mitigate and possibly even to 
repair harm which results from a transfer of hazardous substances 
or technologies."176 Using international law, however, is problematic 
172 See Cassels, supra note 1, at 19. 
173Id. 
174 See Hamiiton, supra note 158, at 15 (citing 28JJ. Eur. Comm. (no. C12) 84 (1985)). 
175Id. at 11. Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration was one form of response to these 
inadequacies: 
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused 
by activities within the jurisdiction of control of such states to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction. 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference), U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.48/14 (1972). 
176Handl, supra note 17, at 612. 
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because a corporation is not subject to international law. As a result, 
there can be no effective enforcement of these rules. In the end, 
international law amounts to "soft" regulations, that is, non-binding 
guidelines and voluntary codes of conduct promulgated by interna-
tional organizations.177 To give teeth to these voluntary guidelines, 
it is thus necessary to combine them with principles of state respon-
sibility.178 
III. CREATIVE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 
A. Parameters of the Discussion 
International disputes involving environmental disasters would be 
best resolved through the application of international law. Of 
course, rather than focusing on ex post facto dispute settlements, 
efforts should ideally concentrate on methods of dispute avoid-
ance. 179 Unfortunately, given the undeveloped state of international 
environmental law, this Article will only address dispute settlement 
techniques. Further, given the quantum of damages at stake, the 
177 Cassels, supra note 1, at 6. Examples of such codes include the United Nations Draft 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, 23 LL.M. 602 (1984) (which resorts to the 
judicial process) and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 LL.M. 967 
(1976). The Clarification of Environmental Concerns in OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises states with regards to Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the General Policies Chapter of the 
Guidelines that the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises 
(CIME), 
believes that the clear intent of this provision is that enterprises, whether they are 
domestic or multinational, should, within the framework of laws, regulations and 
administrative practices in each of the countries in which they operate, take due 
account of the need to protect the environment and to avoid creating environmen-
tally-related health problems. 
25 LL.M. 494 (1986). An additional example is LL.O Tripartite Declaration on Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, 17 LL.M. 423 (1978). 
178 Note also that corporate policies of transnationals are beginning to reflect a change in 
focus in that they are more aware of hazards and methods to prevent them. See generally 
Wessel, supra note 154. 
A good representation of this new attitude is the Valdez Principles [copy available from the 
author]. This is a model shareholder meeting resolution that was drawn up by a range of 
institutional investors and environmentalists in 1989, and is applicable to all types of commer-
cial corporations. The resolution deals with the protection of the biosphere, sustainable use 
of natural resources, and other topics. Of particular relevance is Principle 7 which reads: "[to] 
[t]ake responsibility for harm we cause to the environment by making every effort to fully 
restore the environment and compensate persons adversely affected." See generally id. 
179 Such as domestic and international rules pertaining to monitoring, assessment and 
notice. See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 32, at 159-60; Cooper, supra note 13, at 285; Stein, supra 
note 18, at 285. 
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nature of the identities of the principal players, and the difficulty 
with the enforcement of a possibly unpalatable award from the 
perspective of the transnational corporation, dispute settlement 
methods such as negotiation, mediation/conciliation, and conven-
tional arbitration as they are traditionally perceived will not be 
directly discussed. ISO 
Instead, focus will be on the initial participation of states in a 
process that ironically excludes their immediate presence. The three 
suggested approaches to resolving a dispute over an environmental 
disaster share the following features. First, states are involved in 
implementing the suggested dispute settlement mechanism. 
Through international treaties, two or more states are to agree to 
the establishment of a regime whereby the victims' claims can be 
determined and administered, and the conduct of the transnational 
corporation can be assessed. Second, after establishing a regime, the 
states themselves are to enforce the settlement. 
The suggested mechanisms differ with respect to the degree of 
participation of the victims' state during the settlement of the dis-
pute. Ideally, the mechanism would limit the participation of the 
state espousing the claims of the victims. As previously discussed, the 
state's "cross-cutting interests and competing responsibilities,"lsl as 
well as its own possible liability for having failed to regulate the 
perpetrator of the disaster, undermine the state's objectivity. 
B. The Mechanisms 
1. International Institutional Arbitration: ICSID 
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), an international institution, allows for the settlement of 
180 As we saw in the case of Bhopal, there was far too much at stake, from UCC's refusal to 
admit fault where such a large amount of damage was created, to the politicization of the 
process. Given these circumstances, with the exception of protracted negotiation hidden 
behind the cloud of adjudication that eventually led to the Bhopal settlement, it is doubtful 
whether any of these traditional methods would properly address the priority of quick reso-
lution. 
If the reader wishes to explore these alternatives more generally, however, the following may 
be referred to: for negotiation, Stein, supra note 18, at 293 andJ.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 9, 17, 21 (1991); for mediation, Cooper, supra note 13, at 285, Stein, 
supra note 18, at 298 and MERRILLS, supra, at 3; for conciliation, MERRILLS, supra, at 59-67; 
for arbitration, CHRISTINE D. GRAy,JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 5-58 (1987) 
and MERRILLS, supra, at 80-106. 
lSI Galanter, supra note 35, at 293. For example, one such cross-cutting interest is the state's 
responsibility for the welfare of its citizens versus the state's responsibility to ensure the 
economic viability of the country, possibly by encouraging investment. 
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disputes between a foreign private investor and the state.182 It is an 
institution that was created through an international convention,183 
and has been proven to be one of the most popular multilateral 
arbitration regimes in terms of the number of ratifications re-
ceived.184 ICSID's mandate involves disputes "arising directly out of 
an investment. "185 
The greatest advantage of ICSID is that it initially removes juris-
diction of the dispute from municipal courts, but later employs the 
courts to enforce the decision.186 Use of this mechanism requires the 
contracting states to enforce the decision ofthe Centre.187 The award 
is to be recognized by the parties to the Convention as if it were the 
final judgment of a court in that state. 188 Failure to enforce the 
decision would be a violation of an international treaty, and thus 
would allow direct recourse to international law remedies. 189 
Using ICSID would require the host state to agree with the tran-
snational corporation that all investment disputes would be referred 
to ICSID at the outset of the transnational's investment in the 
country. 190 ICSID is only available to contracting states and investors 
having the nationality of a contracting state.l9l 
Although ICSID has some attractive qualities, such as more certain 
enforcement of the award and lower costs and more efficiency 
compared to litigation,192 its mandate is not suitably tailored to the 
context of an industrial disaster. First, it is uncertain whether ad-
dressing compensation and reparation issues in the context of an 
accident is indeed an "investment dispute."193 Second, because the 
182 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, Aug. 25, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. 
183 STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION BE-
TWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 253 (1990). 
184 Id. 
1851CSID Convention, supra note 182, art. 25(1). 
186 Id. 
187 And contrary to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, a municipal court cannot refuse to enforce the award on grounds of public 
policy, thus avoiding any discussion of the validity of the parens patriae power by India in the 
Bhopal incident. SeeJune 10, 1958,7 I.L.M. 1046 (entered into force June 7,1959). 
188ICSID Convention, supra note 182, art. 54(1). 
189 Charles Vuylsteke, Foreign Investment Protection and ICSID Arbitration, 4 GA. J. INT'L & 
COMPo L., 343, 360 (1974). 
190 ICSID Convention, supra note 182, art. 25 (1). 
191Id. As of June 1989,98 states have signed the Convention, and 91 have ratified. TOOPE, 
supra note 183, at 253. 
192TooPE, supra note 183, at 256. It takes an average of two and a half to three years to 
complete an ICSID arbitration. Id. 
193 SeelCSID Convention, supra note 182, art. 25(1). 
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consent of the parties to refer to ICSID is required at the outset of 
the investment, disputes involving other transnational corporations 
already established within the host state, who did not enter into such 
agreements, are not included. Third, the process may still be too 
slow.194 Fourth, it remains questionable how well ICSID, a 'Western" 
institution, using whatever chosen substantive law, would respond to 
the expectations of the victims with regards to the amount of the 
award. 
Finally, the greatest disadvantage in using an international insti-
tutional arbitration process is that, besides the transnational corpo-
ration, the host state is the only capable party to the dispute. Con-
sequently, the host state must espouse the individual claims of the 
victims. Thus far, the assumption has been that an international 
dispute involving an environmental disaster is a mixed one: the 
parties being the transnational corporation and the state. Techni-
cally, however, it is principally a dispute between private parties: the 
transnational corporation and the victims.195 As has been empha-
sized, however, limiting the participation of the host state in the 
dispute is very desirable. Given its inherent parameters, it does not 
seem that a mixed international institutional arbitration is the best 
way to settle a dispute. 
2. A Claims Settlement Tribunal: The Iran-U.S. Analogy 
A second possible mechanism employs the Claims Tribunal re-
gime that was used in the settlement of disputes between Iran and 
the United States (and its nationals) in the early 1980s. Through 
this method, the victims' state would agree with the transnational 
corporation'S home state that the amount of every claim be deter-
mined expeditiously by a claims settlement tribunaP96 The cost 
would be equally shared, and reflect not only the countries' interest 
in the resolution of the dispute, but would also result in a cost 
savings by avoiding the use of their respective judicial systems as a 
forum.197 In addition, the process would occur in the host state, thus 
making it more accessible to the victims. 
Similar to the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, an equal number of 
194 Two and a half to three years is hardly a desirable amount of time in which to compensate 
the victims of an environmental disaster. See id. 
195 Although the state may have a claim in damages due to the amount of resources it 
expended in treating the victims and cleaning up the site. 
196 See MacGraw, supra note 19, at 846. 
197Id. 
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tribunal members would be appointed by each state.198 Those mem-
bers would then appoint a third group of members. 199 Of this group, 
one would be the President of the Tribunal,2°o 
Unlike ICSID, a claims settlement tribunal has the flexibility to 
allow both parties to be private. The home state of the transnational 
corporation and the state of the victims would create the tribunal 
through the enabling instrument of a treaty. The parties that would 
appear before the members of the tribunal, however, would be the 
transnational corporation and the victims. 201 
The claims settlement tribunal method responds well to the pri-
orities of the settlement of a dispute concerning an environmental 
disaster. Depending on the time in which the tribunal is established, 
it can be relatively efficient. By having both states represented by 
members of the tribunal, considerations such as legal and cultural 
diversity, as well as economic concerns, are not disregarded. It is also 
relatively accessible to the victims if it is situated in the state where 
the disaster occurred and if the victims are encouraged to bring 
claims before it. Through the accord establishing the tribunal, all 
existing or future legal proceedings can be terminated.202 
Enforcement of the awards, however, may be difficult. Once the 
awards are determined, the transnational corporation can object to 
paying them.203 Absent the participation of any state espousing the 
victims' claims, there are no obvious grounds for a conflict of inter-
est, or any abuse of the parens patriae power to deter enforcement 
in the municipal courts of the transnational's home state.204 Depend-
ing on the facts at issue, the corporation can still object to enforce-
ment based on public policy grounds or lack of jurisdiction. 205 Re-
198 See MERRILLS, supra note 180, at 84. In the Iran-U.S. instance, three members were 
appointed by each state. The six members then got together and appointed another three 
members who were not from either state. [d. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 The victims could be represented by a privately organized class action, or could appear 
individually. Alternatively, the government could involve itself indirectly by agreeing to estab-
lish and fund a public advocacy group that would represent the victims, without having the 
government directly participate in the proceedings, thus avoiding any conflict of interest 
problems. 
202 In the Iran-U.S. situation, the U.S. nationals' agreement to drop all claims that were filed 
in the courts represented the quid pro quo for the creation of the Security Account. See TOOPE, 
supra note 183, at 361. 
203 [d. at 280. 
204 [d. at 362. 
205 [d. 
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gardless of its merits, any opposition to enforcement would ulti-
mately delay the distribution of the compensation to the victims. 
To address these potential enforcement problems, the claims set-
tlement tribunal could use, as did the Iran-U.S. tribunal, one of the 
most certain means of enforcement: a security account. 206 This de-
vice would provide for the payment by the transnational corporation 
of a lump sum into an interest-bearing account.207 The money would 
"secure the payment of, and pay claims against ... [the transna-
tional] ... in accordance with the claims settlement agreement. "208 
A minimum balance would have to be maintained, with reimburse-
ments made periodically in order to maintain that balance. As was 
remarked in the Iran-U.S. context 
[n] ot only does it provide remarkable ease of enforcement, 
its existence undoubtedly encouraged many claimants to 
come to the Tribunal in the first place. In this regard, it is 
important to recall that, although there were only a few 
hundred suits filed in US courts against Iran when the 
Claims Settlement was being negotiated, by the time the 
deadline for Tribunal claims passed, no less than 3,836 
cases had been lodged, only ninety of which were state-to-
state claims or interpretational cases.209 
Yet, despite the attractiveness of the concept of a security account, 
it has serious deficiencies when applied to a dispute in which a 
transnational corporation is the antagonist. First, by paying the lump 
sum in advance, the transnational corporation in effect could be 
making an admission of guilt, a position a corporation is unlikely to 
assume. Second, tying up a large sum of money for a long period of 
time in the security account is not particularly attractive to a corpo-
ration, as it affects the transnational's financial viability. Therefore, 
based on the potential enforcement problems that a claims settle-
ment tribunal might have, it might not address all possible concerns 
when attempting to resolve a dispute involving an industrial disaster. 
3. An International Institutional Body 
A third approach to dispute resolution of environmental disasters 
involves the use of a multilateral treaty, which creates a regime of 
strict liability, and is accompanied by an international insurance 
206 !d. at 363. 
207 [d. 
208 [d. at 280. 
209 [d. at 281. 
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fund. This differs from the first two approaches in that it institutes 
a process of avoiding disputes and resolves problems that arise before 
environmental damage occurs. Inspiration for this mechanism 
comes from two international oil pollution treaties: the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil 
Liability Convention)210 and the Convention on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Dam-
age (International Fund Convention) .211 
Applying the Civil Liability Convention to the case at hand, the 
transnational corporation is liable once it is proven that the envi-
ronmental disaster was a product of the transnational's operations 
in the host state.212 Liability would only be avoided if force majeure 
could be proven.213 Also, the transnational corporation could limit 
its liability by depositing a sum representing its maximum liability 
into a fund with the court of one of the contracting states. The fund 
would then be distributed among the claimants.214 The benefits of 
making a prompt contribution to the fund would be that once the 
fund was created, no one else could make a claim against the 
transnational's other assets.215 Finally, the regime would also provide 
for prescription.216 
The drawback of such a mechanism is that compensation to the 
victims is limited if liability is limited-a prospect to be avoided. In 
response to this prospect, the International Fund Convention was 
established in the oil pollution context for victims unable to obtain 
full and adequate compensation from the civil liability method.217 
Contributions to the fund would be made by transnational corpora-
tions involved in the international trade of hazardous products and 
technologies. 218 The undercompensated victim could then bring an 
action against the fund before the appropriate jurisdiction. 
210 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970) [hereinafter Civil Liability Convention]. 
21111 I.L.M. 284 (1972) [hereinafter Compensation Fund Convention]. 
212 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 210, art. II. This notion of strict liability is also 
central to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 
1960, art. 3,956 V.N.T.S. 251. Article 3 establishes that the operator of a nuclear installation 
shall be liable upon the occurrence of a nuclear accident. [d. art. 3. To compensate for this 
strict liability, however, a maximum liability of a certain amount is established. [d. art. 7. 
213 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, supra note 212, art. 
3. 
214 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 210, art. V. 
215 [d. art. VI. 
216 In the oil pollution context, the claimant has, depending on the circumstances, three to 
six years to register a claim. 
217 Compensation Fund Convention, supra note 211, arts. 2,4. 
218 [d. art. 10. Contributions would be made by any person who had received a certain 
amount of oil within a calendar year. [d. 
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There are several advantages to such a mechanism. First, litigation 
on the issue of fault is avoided. Although adjudication in the na-
tional courts is used, it solely determines the extent of the claim of 
a particular victim, and subsequently distributes the award. As a 
result, compensation is paid almost immediately. Second, no states 
are directly involved, thus reducing the amount of politicization that 
could occur in such a situation. Third, as it is a multilateral regime, 
no transnational corporation could escape it by forum shopping, 
unless it could find a state that was not party to the treaty. Fourth, 
as the national courts of the contracting state are involved, the 
distribution of the remedy may be made in accordance with the legal 
culture of the place of the accident. Fifth, because this regime would 
be the compulsory jurisdiction for environmental disaster disputes, 
all outstanding claims could be resolved. Finally, because the award 
in a developing country may be less than the award given in a 
developed country, some fear that this mechanism fails to provide 
guidance for the transnational's conduct. This fear could be allevi-
ated, however, by the knowledge that the mere existence of a mul-
tilateral treaty addressing the concern could affect the operations 
of a transnational. 
CONCLUSION 
On December 2, 1984, a large quantity of methyl isocyanate gas 
escaped from a pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, resulting in one of 
the worst human-made environmental disasters. Thousands of peo-
ple died and hundreds of thousands more were injured. Although 
the direct physical injuries were horrific in themselves, human suf-
fering was greatly exacerbated by the absolute inadequacies of the 
dispute settlement process in the years to follow. Because an envi-
ronmental disaster involving a transnational corporation's activity in 
another country is likely to happen again, it is necessary to devise a 
dispute resolution technique that attempts to contain the catastro-
phe to the immediate effects of the incident on the victims. In the 
absence of such a technique, the effects of the incident may be 
amplified to the extent that the effects of the ensuing dispute be-
come more tragic than the event itself. 
Attempting to resolve an international dispute involving an envi-
ronmental disaster is a very delicate and intricate undertaking. This 
is due to two things: the nature of the disaster, and the nature of 
the parties involved in the dispute. In trying to balance the priorities 
that should be addressed in this type of dispute against the consid-
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erations that must necessarily be made, it is difficult to derive the 
optimum dispute settlement mechanism. 
Even with the solution this article proposes-a strict liability in-
. surance mechanism that initially requires states to establish it, with 
subsequent exclusive participation of the transnational corporation 
and the victims-there are still some outstanding concerns. For 
although adjudication was shown to be a failure in Bhopal, many 
believe that litigation between parties will always have merits that no 
other mechanism could possess. 
Besides avoiding institutionalizing the problem, the factual com-
plexities of this type of dispute are still not properly addressed in 
any of the suggested mechanisms. For example, with the strict liabil-
ity insurance fund, it could be discovered ten years after compensa-
tion is paid out that the long-term effects of the accident are very 
grave and that the initial compensation was not sufficient. On this 
basis, some sort of fact-finding regime is required as well. Addition-
ally, compulsory jurisdiction immediately precludes any alternatives, 
thus limiting creativity in attempting to resolve the dispute more 
effectively. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the merits of each form of dispute 
settlement, it is crucial that parties have a choice of dispute settle-
ment mechanisms. The disputing parties, therefore, could select a 
dispute mechanism appropriate to their conflict, and they would 
realize that the pursuit of a remedy in a national court may not 
always be the best solution. As the Bhopal experience demonstrated, 
the welfare of the victims depends on the efficacy and comprehen-
siveness of the process selected-and it is the victims' plight that 
must come first. 
An environmental disaster involving a transnational corporation's 
activity in another country will happen again. Indeed, although this 
article focused attention on states such as India, disasters of this 
nature may occur in developed countries. The question remains 
whether to contain the catastrophe to the immediate effects of the 
incident on the victims or to risk amplifYing it to the extent that the 
effects of the ensuing dispute become more tragic than the event 
itself. 
